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Abstract 
The paper examines the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs) in the European Union via National Action Plans (NAPs). We argue that some of the 
procedural and substantive shortcomings currently observed in the implementation process could 
effectively be addressed through the Open Method of Coordination – a governance instrument that the 
EU has already successfully used in other policy domains such as employment, social protection and 
education. Section two sketches out the polycentric global governance approach envisaged by the 
UNGPs and discusses the institutional and policy background of their implementation in the European 
Union. Section three provides an assessment of EU Member State National Action Plans on business 
and human rights, as benchmarked against international NAP guidance. Section four relates experiences 
with the existing NAP process to the policy background and rationale of the Open Method of 
Coordination and discusses the conditions for employing the OMC in the business and human rights 
domain. Against this background, section five make some more concrete proposals for developing an 
Open Method of Coordination on Business and Human Rights. 
Keywords 
Human Rights, Business, United Nations Guiding Principles, Open Method of Coordination, National 
Action Plan 
 
  1 
Introduction 
In June 2016 the Council of the European Union published its Conclusions on Business and Human 
Rights,1 marking the 5th anniversary of the endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGPs) by the UN Human Rights Council.2 The UNGPs are the first universally 
accepted global framework on business and human rights, developed by Professor John Ruggie in his 
capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business entities (SRSG).3 Following the end of the SRSG’s 
mandate in 2011, a UN Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Entities was established to promote the ‘effective and comprehensive dissemination 
and implementation’ of the UNGPs.4 The UN Working Group has inter alia encouraged States to 
develop National Action Plans (NAPs) on business and human rights.5 NAPs are policy documents in 
which States outline strategies and instruments to comply with their duty to prevent and redress 
corporate-related human rights abuse, as laid down in international human rights law and restated in the 
first and the third pillar of the UNGPs. Reiterating the European Union’s support of the UN Guiding 
Principles, the 2016 Council Conclusions on Business and Human Rights welcome the European 
Commission’s intention to develop an EU Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct that should 
outline an overall European policy framework to enhance the further implementation of the UNGPs.6 
The European Council further notes that ‘EU Member States have taken the lead internationally on 
developing and adopting National Action Plans to implement the Guiding Principles or integrating 
[them] into national CSR Strategies’. In this regard, it encourages the European Commission and the 
European External Action Service ‘to promote peer learning on business and human rights, including 
cross-regional peer learning’.7 
The paper examines the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs) in the European Union via National Action Plans (NAPs). We argue that some of the 
procedural and substantive shortcomings currently observed in the implementation process could 
effectively be addressed through the Open Method of Coordination – a governance instrument that the 
EU has already successfully used in other policy domains such as employment, social protection and 
education. Section two sketches out the polycentric global governance approach envisaged by the 
UNGPs and discusses the institutional and policy background of their implementation in the European 
Union. Section three provides an assessment of EU Member State National Action Plans on business 
and human rights, as benchmarked against international NAP guidance. Section four relates experiences 
with the existing NAP process to the policy background and rationale of the Open Method of 
Coordination and discusses the conditions for employing the OMC in the business and human rights 
domain. Against this background, section five make some more concrete proposals for developing an 
Open Method of Coordination on Business and Human Rights. 
                                                     
1 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Business and Human Rights’, 3477th meeting of the Foreign Affairs 
Council, 10254/16 (20 June 2016). 
2 H. R. C., ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011). 
3 For a more detailed account of the evolution of the UNGPs see P. Thielbörger & T. Ackermann, ‘A Treaty on Enforcing 
Human Rights against Business: Closing the Loophole or Getting Stuck in a Loop’, Indiana Journal of Legal Studies 
(2017), forthcoming. 
4 H. R. C., ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities’, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (06 July 2011). 
5 U. N. Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Working Group on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises’, A/69/263 (6 August 2014). 
6 See Council Conclusions (n 1) para 6. 
7 Id. para 5. 
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The UNGPs Polycentric Global Governance Approach 
The UNGPs build on three pillars: (i) the state duty to protect human rights against violations by third 
parties, including corporations; (ii) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, meaning to act 
with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights of others; and (iii) greater access to effective remedies, 
both judicial and non-judicial, for victims of corporate human rights abuse. The overall goal of this 
‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework is to address today’s business and human rights challenges by 
closing ‘governance gaps created by globalisation’: 
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the governance gaps created 
by globalisation – between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of 
societies to manage their adverse consequences. These governance gaps provide the permissive 
environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. 
How to narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is our fundamental challenge.8 
While this is not the place for a detailed discussion of the global governance system envisaged by the 
UNGPs, a number of its core elements relevant to the further analysis should be highlighted. The UNGPs 
adopt a polycentric approach to preventing and redressing corporate-related human rights abuse based 
on the insight that corporate conduct at the global level is shaped by three different governance systems: 
a political governance system comprising the rules of domestic and international public law; a civil 
governance system in which stakeholders affected by business operations employ social and legal 
compliance mechanisms such as advocacy campaigns and strategic litigation; and a corporate 
governance system which internalises pressures and expectations of the other two systems.9 The UNGPs 
aim at intertwining these governance systems through creating mutual leverage and interdependencies. 
This is to spur a ‘new regulatory dynamic’ towards a ‘more comprehensive and effective global regime’ 
in which the different governance systems ‘each come to add distinct value, compensate for one 
another’s weaknesses, and play mutually reinforcing roles’.10 The three pillars of the UNGPs should 
thus not be treated in isolation but rather form a complementary whole. Together, they posit a system in 
which States are duty-bound to ‘translate’ international human rights norms into domestic laws and 
policies regulating corporate activities, while corporations respect human rights as globally recognised 
standards of expected conduct (their ‘social licence to operate’), with both providing remediation for 
breaches of these overlapping governance systems within their respective jurisdictions.11 
One important consequence of the UNGPs’ polycentric governance approach is that States, as part of 
their duty to protect, have to assume a proactive role in ensuring corporate respect for human rights. 
This pertains not only to the interplay between pillar one and pillar two but also to the relationship 
between state-based and corporate-based remediation that together form pillar three. To this end, States 
have to mainstream human rights into all business-related laws and policies. While the UNGPs should 
not be seen as a ‘toolbox’ premised on a one-size-fits-all approach, they stress the importance of 
ensuring vertical and horizontal policy coherence in the domestic realm as well as in States’ cooperation 
                                                     
8 H. R. C., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’, A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) para 3 
(‘2008 Report’). 
9 J. Ruggie, ‘Regulating Multinationals: The UN Guiding Principles, Civil Society, and International Legalization’, Regulatory 
Policy Program Working Paper RPP-2015-04 (Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard 
Kennedy School: 2015) 2. 
10 J. Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (Norton: 2013). 
11 See further L. C. Backer, ‘On the Evolution of the United Nations’ “Protect-Respect-Remedy’ Project: The State, the 
Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context’, 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law (2011) 37-
80. 
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with each other through multilateral agreements and international institutions.12 Effective leverage 
between the different governance systems furthermore requires States to adopt a ‘smart mix’ of 
mandatory and voluntary instruments in preventing and redressing corporate-related human rights 
abuse. This is of particular relevance in the ‘state-business nexus’: 
States should take additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by business enterprises that 
are owned or controlled by the State, or that receive substantial support and services from State agencies 
such as export credit agencies or official investment insurance or guarantee agencies, including, where 
appropriate, by requiring human rights due diligence.13 
Finally, closing governance gaps at the global level requires States to make use of extraterritorial 
instruments that can range from so-called home-state or parent-based regulation to softer measures 
incentivising or supporting corporations to respect human rights when doing business abroad.14 
The EU’s Contribution to the Development and Implementation of the UNGPs 
The European Union has played a proactive role in the development and implementation of the 
UNGPs.15 Already in its 2009 Conclusions on Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries, 
the Council of the European Union expressed its full support of the UNGPs and reaffirmed its 
commitment to promote human rights globally and across all relevant policy domains.16 The UNGPs 
should become a ‘key element for the global development of CSR practices’ and provide ‘a significant 
input to the CSR work of the European Union’ that now had to be taken further by ‘developing common 
frameworks, raising awareness and improving dialogue between all stakeholders, and measuring and 
evaluating tangible results’.17 In response, the European Commission adopted in 2011 a new strategy 
for corporate social responsibility and more recently committed to developing an EU Action Plan on 
Responsible Business Conduct expected for early 2017.18 The 2011 strategy steered away from the 
Commission’s ‘voluntary’ approach to CSR by emphasising the ‘responsibility of enterprises for their 
impacts on society’ and expressing the expectation that ‘all European enterprises meet the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights’ (2nd pillar of the UNGPs). To comply with their duty to protect 
(1st pillar of the UNGPs), EU Member States should ‘develop by the end of 2012 national plans for the 
implementation of the UN Guiding Principles’. This request was reiterated in the Council of the 
European Union’s 2012 and 2015 Action Plans on Human Rights and Democracy, with the deadline for 
Member State NAPs being extended to 2017.19 
                                                     
12 See UNGPs (n 2) paras 8-10. 
13 Id. para 4. 
14 In this regard, the SRSG distinguished between ‘direct extraterritorial jurisdiction’ and ‘domestic measures with 
extraterritorial implications’. While the former refers to ‘jurisdiction exercised directly in relation to actors or activities 
overseas’, the latter ‘relies on territory as a jurisdictional basis even though it may have extraterritorial implications’; see 
H. R. C., ‘Business and Human Rights: Further Steps towards the Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework’, A/HRC/14/27 (9 April 2010) para 55 (‘2010 Report’); see further D. Augenstein & D. Kinley, ‘When Human 
Rights “Responsibilities” become “Duties”: The Extra-Territorial Obligations of States that Bind Corporations’, in S. Deva 
& D. Bilchitz (eds.), Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge University Press: 2013) 271-294. 
15 For a more detailed account see D. Augenstein et al., ‘Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment 
Applicable to European Enterprises Operating outside the European Union’ (European Commission: 2010). 
16 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries’, 2985th 
Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 17218/09 (8 December 2009). 
17 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ‘Conference Report: Protect, Respect, Remedy – A Conference on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR)’, Stockholm 10-11 November 2009. 
18 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility’, COM (2011) 681 final. 
19 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, 11855/12 
(25 June 2012); ‘EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’ (20 July 2015). 
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Following the Commission’s timely initiative, a number of Member States developed National Action 
Plans prior to the UN Working Group (UNWG) publishing its official NAP guidance in December 
2014.20 At present, seven EU Member States have released NAPs on business and human rights (the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, Sweden and Germany) and 9 further 
Member States have produced drafts or have initiated a NAP process (Czech Republic, France, Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain).21 The majority of Member States have furthermore 
published NAPs on CSR that also make reference to human rights.22 In terms of quantity if not quality, 
this makes the European Union a global leader in developing NAPs on business and human rights. 
The European Union Approach to Implementing the UNGPs 
Recalling the duty of States, ‘acting within their jurisdiction … to protect human rights, including 
against abuses committed by companies even if they operate in third countries’, a recent European 
Parliament Resolution requests the European Commission and the Member States ‘to guarantee policy 
coherence on business and human rights at all levels: within different EU institutions, between the 
institutions, and between the EU and its Member States, and in particular in relation to the Union’s trade 
policy’.23 The proper functioning of the European Union with its highly integrated internal market and 
its extensive free movement guarantees (of goods, services, capital and workers) depends greatly on a 
coherent and reasonably harmonized body of rules,24 including in the field of business and human rights. 
At the same time, what complicates the implementation of the UNGPs in the European Union context 
is the so-called principle of conferral that only permits the EU institutions to act within the confines of 
competences conferred upon them by the Member States and in pursuance of objectives set out in the 
European Treaties.25 This poses difficulties not only with regard to identifying the competent actor(s) 
but also with regard to aligning EU and Member State measures to protect human rights against 
corporate-related abuse. The UNGPs take a holistic approach to business and human rights that requires 
action across a wide range of legal and policy domains many of which lie outside the EU’s (exclusive) 
competence. Internally, the EU needs to ensure policy coherence not only between its own institutions 
and agencies but also in relation to the Member States. Externally, the EU is tasked by the European 
Treaties to ‘define and pursue common policies and actions, [and] to work for a high degree of co-
operation in all fields of international relations’ in order to consolidate and support human rights.26  
The 2015 EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy and a 2015 European Commission Staff 
Working Document carve out the European Union’s three-layered approach to advancing business and 
human rights.27 At the global level, the EU aims at developing the capacity and knowledge necessary 
for an effective implementation of the UNGPs. Initiatives range from the inclusion of human rights and 
                                                     
20 U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, ‘Guidance on National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights’ 
(December 2014); a revised version of the Guidance was published in November 2015, with a third and final version 
forthcoming. 
21 Within the EU, Scotland will develop its own National Action Plan. Of the European countries without EU membership, 
Norway published its NAP in 2015 and Switzerland in December 2016; for a global overview see Business & Human 
Rights Resource Centre: National Action Plans, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/ 
NationalActionPlans.aspx. 
22 European Commission, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: National Public Policies in the European Union’ (June 2014). 
23 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on corporate liability for serious human rights abuses in third countries’, 2015/2315(INI) 
(25 October 2016) paras 13-14. 
24 See, for example European Commission, ‘Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth’, 
COM(2010) 2020 final (3 March 2010). 
25 Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001/0390. 
26 See Article 21 Treaty on European Union. 
27 See ‘EU Action Plan 2015’ (n 19) 29; European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document on Implementing the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – State of Play’, SWD(2015) 144 final (14 July 2015). 
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CSR clauses in international trade and cooperation agreements to a rights-based approach to 
development and the promotion of NAPs in policy dialogues with non-EU countries. Within the EU 
legal framework, the Union has developed legislation and published various guidelines to encourage 
and support business enterprises in complying with their corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights. Among these measures are a revision of existing accounting directives to require large companies 
and groups to disclose information on policies, risks and results concerning human rights, the 
environment and social- and employee related matters; an overhaul of EU public procurement rules to 
facilitate the use of social and environmental criteria in the selection process; and a strong focus on 
business and human rights in its overall CSR strategy. In relation to the Member States, the EU has 
focused on encouraging and supporting the development of National Action Plans on business and 
human rights and the incorporation of the UNGPs into national CSR strategies, including through 
facilitating coordination and sharing of best practices. To promote the development of National Action 
Plans on CSR, a peer review process was established that also considered the UNGPs and that led to the 
publication of a CSR Compendium in 2014.28 Some Member States have requested the European 
Commission to put into place a parallel peer review process dedicated to the development of NAPs on 
business and human rights.29 
NAP Guidance and EU Member State National Action Plans 
International NAP Guidance 
The two most important international guidelines assisting States in the development, implementation 
and review of NAPs are the Guidance on National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights 
developed by the UNGP-WG (UNWG Guidance);30 and a Toolkit on National Action Plans on Business 
and Human Rights published by the Danish Institute for Human Rights in collaboration with the 
International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (DIHR/ICAR Guidance).31 Drawing on extensive 
multi-stakeholder consultations and previous experiences with developing NAPs, both guidelines flesh 
out the UNGP’s procedural and substantive requirements concerning the state duty to protect human 
rights.  
National Action Plans on business and human rights should pursue three overarching objectives: taking 
stock of existing state measures that contribute to the implementation of the UNGPs; identifying gaps 
in States’ legal and policy framework that require further action; and outlining strategies to close 
protection gaps and to otherwise prevent and redress corporate-related human rights abuse. In this 
regard, the UNWG Guidance emphasises four criteria essential for a NAP to be effective. First, NAPs 
must be based on the UNGPs, incorporate all three pillars and be informed by basic human rights 
principles such as non-discrimination and equality. Second, NAPs must respond to challenges in the 
national context and reflect country-specific priorities or particularly important sectors within the 
national economy. Third, they must be developed and implemented through an inclusive and transparent 
process, taking the views and needs of affected parties and relevant (governmental and non-
governmental) actors into account. Fourth, NAPs must be regularly reviewed to ensure continuous 
progress in enhancing human rights protection and effective responses to changing conditions in the 
                                                     
28 See ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (n 22). The European Commission has furthermore organised pilot peer reviews on 
business and human rights in the capitals of seven EU Member States, see http://ec.europa.eu/ 
social/keyDocuments.jsp?advSearchKey=CSRprreport&mode=advancedSubmit&langId=en&policyArea=&type=0&cou
ntry=0&year=0. 
29 See ‘Commission Staff Working Document’ (n 27) 34. 
30 See UNWG Guidance (n 20). 
31 DIHR & ICAR, ‘National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: A Toolkit for the Development, Implementation, 
and Review of State Commitments to Business and Human Rights Frameworks’ (June 2014). 
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regulatory environment.32 The DIHR/ICAR Guidance identifies the following benefits of using NAPs 
in the business and human rights domain: coordinating government efforts in developing policies by 
identifying and involving all relevant actors, therewith avoiding duplication and inconsistencies between 
government departments; offering a common platform for robust collaboration, dialogue and trust-
building among stakeholders; and mobilising stakeholder resources beyond government to achieve 
policy aims.33  
The UNWG Guidance and the DIHR/ICAR Guidance contain more detailed process- and content-based 
criteria for developing and implementing a NAP. Both documents recommend that States make a formal 
commitment to engage in a NAP process, including publication of the terms of reference and a timeline. 
States should furthermore establish a format for inter-ministerial and cross-departmental collaboration, 
develop and publish a work plan and make adequate resources available.34 Stakeholder participation in 
line with a rights-based approach is critical for a successful development of a NAP. States should 
conduct and publish a stakeholder mapping to ensure the equal inclusion of all affected parties. 
Meaningful and effective participation should be ensured through capacity building and providing all 
stakeholders with adequate and timely information. Stakeholders should participate in the identification 
of national priority areas and implementation gaps, as well as in the development of instruments to 
enhance human rights protection against corporate abuse.35 In preparation of drafting a NAP, a national 
baseline assessment should be conducted by a competent independent body (external research institutes, 
NHRIs, etc.) that maps out the current state of implementation of the UNGPs. The draft NAP should be 
widely disseminated and discussed with all relevant stakeholders prior to being finalized and officially 
launched.36 A NAP should address the full scope of the UNGPs, while also taking into account cognate 
business and human rights frameworks (such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises) 
and local/regional and sector-specific human rights issues. It should contain a ‘smart mix’ of mandatory 
and voluntary, and national and international measures,37 and ‘extend to all matters in the state’s 
jurisdiction, including matters outside the state’s territorial jurisdiction’.38 NAPs should outline actions 
to implement the UNGPs that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-specific 
(SMART).39 They should also lay down a framework for monitoring and reporting, based on a clear 
allocation of responsibility and accountability for implementation. All relevant ministries and 
government departments should collaborate in the implementation process, supported by a multi-
stakeholder group and other institutions including NHRIs.40 Finally, NAPs should be regularly 
reviewed, evaluated and updated in order to identify successes and failures, remedy shortcomings, and 
share information and best practices within and between governments.41 
Overall Assessment of EU Member State NAPs 
While as noted above, the EU Member States have played a pioneering role in the early development of 
National Action Plans on business and human rights, their NAPs have also been criticized for 
shortcomings in process and content. A 2014 assessment of the UK, Dutch, Danish and Finnish NAP 
                                                     
32 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 3-4. 
33 See DIHR/ICAR Guidance (n 31) 14. 
34 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 5-6; DIHR/ICAR Guidance (n 31) 41-42. 
35 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 6-8; DIHR/ICAR Guidance (n 31) 43-44. 
36 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 7-8; DIHR/ICAR Guidance (n 31) 44-45. 
37 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 12. 
38 See DIHR/ICAR Guidance (n 31) 45. 
39 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 12; DIHR/ICAR Guidance (n 31) 46. 
40 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 9; DIHR/ICAR Guidance (n 31) 47. 
41 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 10; DIHR/ICHR Guidance (n 31) 49. 
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conducted by ICAR and the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ) suggests that while States 
have involved various entities within the government and external parties in the drafting process, the 
mapping of relevant stakeholders and existing protection gaps as well as the inclusiveness and quality 
of consultations left something to be desired. In terms of content, while all four NAPS scrutinized by 
ICAR and ECCJ made an explicit commitment to the UNGPs, they focus heavily on past actions and 
soft/voluntary measures (such as awareness raising or training) at the expense of exploring forward-
looking and regulatory options. Commitments to future action tend to remain vague and lack sufficient 
information about concrete steps to be taken and the agencies responsible for implementation.42  
In a similar vein, the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI) has deplored 
procedural and substantive shortcomings in the development of EU Member State NAPs: 
Ongoing NAP processes in some Member States are neither participatory nor transparent, with 
stakeholders involved weakly or not at all, and civil society organizations in particular frequently 
lacking even basic information or opportunities to engage in dialogue with government representatives. 
Member States’ published NAPs to date mostly describe historical actions, and lack specific 
commitments capable of demonstrably improving UNGPs implementation at national level.43 
Noting that ‘such weaknesses undermine NAP’s contribution to respect for human rights, good 
governance and accountability both in the EU and abroad’, ENNHRI has called upon the European 
Commission to better guide Member States through the NAP process and to establish a ‘human rights-
based, participatory, transparent multi-stakeholder NAP review process at EU level’.44 Such a NAP 
review process should support the implementation of the UNGPs by 
 Permitting Member States to present their experiences on business and human rights and NAPs, 
and to learn from each other by considering lessons learnt and identifying best practices 
 Facilitating the scrutiny of law, policy and actions at EU and Member State levels across relevant 
sectors 
 And enabling a structured dialogue involving all stakeholder groups on opportunities and common 
challenges.45 
More specifically, the following procedural and substantive shortcomings in the development and 
implementation of EU Member State NAPs risk undermining the polycentric governance approach 
envisaged by the UNGPs: a failure to use indicators and benchmarks to measure success and insufficient 
attention to review and follow-up action; and a misalignment of the three pillars, coupled with a failure 
to adopt a smart regulatory mix including extraterritorial measures. 
No Use of Indicators and Benchmarks and Insufficient Provision for Review and Follow-up 
For States to design SMART actions implementing the UNGPs, the effects of the employed means have 
to be ‘measurable’.46 Classical tools of measuring effectiveness of public policies are indicators and 
                                                     
42 International Corporate Accountability Roundtable & European Coalition for Corporate Justice, ‘Assessments of Existing 
National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights’ (November 2014) 3-5. 
43 European Network of National Human Rights Institutions, ‘Recommendations for the next EU Strategy on CSR’ (April 
2015) 2. 
44 Id. 2, 3. In a similar vein, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has called upon States to ‘share plans on the 
national implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including revised National Action 
Plans and best practice concerning the development and review of National Action Plans …’; see Council of Europe, 
‘Recommendation CM/Rec(20163 of the Committee of Ministers to the Member States on human rights and business’, 
1249th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (02 March 2016) p. 1. 
45 See ENNHR (n 43) 3. 
46 According to the ICAR-ECCJ Guidance, SMART actions are those that are ‘specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and 
time-specific’; see ICAR-ECCJ Guidance (n 31) 46. 
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benchmarks. Indicators are parameters that assess whether and to what extent (the laws and policies 
envisaged in) the NAPs have proven suitable to contribute to an effective implementation of the UNGPs; 
benchmarks are quantifiable targets that States set themselves to achieve in that regard. None of the 
current NAPs lists quantitative or qualitative indicators, nor do they generally set concrete benchmarks 
to be achieved. To some extent, this lack of indicators and benchmarks may not be surprising, given that 
these parameters also receive little attention in the guidance provided by UNWG and DIHR/ICAR.47 
Possible indicators and benchmarks that could be used are various, ranging from the number of 
corporations of a certain size having adopted a human rights due diligence mechanism (as defined in the 
second pillar of the UNGPs) to the amount of (public and private) funding being dedicated to the 
implementation process. 
The recent German NAP sets a benchmark of 50% of large German companies having incorporated 
human rights due diligence by 2020.48 Some other EU Member State NAPs offer suitable entry points 
for using indicators and benchmarks. The Swedish NAP, for instance, encourages companies to create 
grievance and redress mechanisms (e.g. ombudsmen mechanisms), but falls short of setting a concrete 
benchmark to be achieved.49 The Lithuanian NAP promises to offer awards for responsible businesses 
and best anti-corruption practices, without however quantifying or measuring these efforts.50 The 
Finnish NAP considers that new funding lines to support the UNGPs could ‘possibly’ be made available 
but fails to indicate any concrete time commitment or target as to the intended amount.51 A commitment 
to hold roundtable meetings with all relevant stakeholders on a sector-by-sector basis remains similarly 
vague.52 Recent studies on the suitability of indicators and benchmarks in assessing business-related 
human rights impacts provide a solid basis for including such indicators and benchmarks into the 
NAPs.53 This would render the envisaged actions more measurable and the implementing institutions 
more accountable. Moreover, while some EU Member States have already conducted comparative 
studies in areas of law and policy relevant to business and human rights,54 a set of agreed indicators and 
benchmarks would facilitate cross-country comparison and contribute to achieving policy coherence at 
the European level. 
The provisions concerning review and update in the EU Member State NAPs are overall weak and 
incomplete. Commonly, the lack of specific commitments concerning review goes hand in hand with a 
failure to specify the institution responsible and accountable for the NAP update. The Netherlands 
Institute for Human Rights has urged the Dutch Government to provide ‘more specific information about 
                                                     
47 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) and DIHR/ICAR Guidance (n 31). In addition, States seem to treat the respective guidance 
documents as laying down exhaustive rather than minimum standards, with the consequence that requirements not listed 
in the Guidance are unlikely to be considered in the NAPs. 
48 German Government, ‘Nationaler Aktionsplan: Umsetzung der VN-Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte 2016-
2020‘ (21 December 2016) 41. 
49 Government Offices of Sweden, ‘Action Plan for Business and Human Rights’ (August 2015) 17. 
50 Government of the Republic of Lithuania, ‘Lithuania’s Action Plan on the Implementation of the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (March 2015) 7. 
51 Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy, ‘National Action Plan for the Implementation of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (October 2014) 29. 
52 Id. 26. 
53 D. Tromp, ‘Assessing Business Related Impacts on Human Rights, Indicators and Benchmark in Standards and Practice’, 
INEF Report 110/2016 (December 2016). 
54 For example, the Dutch Government has recently published a comparative study on duties of care of Dutch business 
enterprises with respect to international corporate social responsibility; see L. Enneking et al., ‘Zorgplichten van 
Nederlands ondernemingen insake internationaal maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen’ (2015), 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2016/04/21/zorgplichten-van-nederlandse-ondernemingen-inzake-
internationaal-maatschappelijk-verantwoord-ondernemen. 
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the follow-up of the National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights’.55 The Swedish NAP 
indicates that there could be a review in 2017 without using mandatory language or circumscribing the 
scope of such a review.56 While the Finnish NAP provides for yearly monitoring by the Finnish 
Committee on Corporate Social Responsibility, there is no timeframe set for an official adaptation and 
update process.57 The same is true of the Danish NAP that merely promises to ‘continuously update 
Danish priorities with regard to the implementation of the UNGPs’ in alignment with its National Action 
Plan on CSR.58 The United Kingdom is currently the only country to have published an updated version 
of its NAP. The update serves mainly to record government achievements since the publication of the 
initial NAP in 2013 and to reflect more recent international developments, including guidance on 
implementation and the experience of other countries.59 While the UK update itself does not add much 
to the original NAP in terms of forward-looking actions, the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights has 
launched an (ongoing) inquiry into human rights and business that scrutinises the steps the Government 
takes to monitor compliance with the UNGPs; to clarify how far the Government is able to enforce the 
UNGPs; to review progress British business has made in carrying out its responsibility to respect human 
rights; and to verify whether victims of human rights abuse involving business enterprises within UK 
jurisdiction have access to effective remedy.60 The UK example points to the importance of regularly 
reviewing and updating NAPs, under the scrutiny of parliamentary bodies sufficiently independent from 
government. The UNWG Guidance suggests that the review and update process should include the 
following steps: evaluation of the impact of the previous NAP; identification of governance gaps and 
priority areas in consultation with stakeholders; identification of measures to address gaps and priority 
areas in consultation with stakeholders; drafting of an updated NAP and further consultation prior to the 
finalisation and official launch.61 A regular review and update process is indispensable to adopt NAPs 
to a changing international regulatory and economic environment. Identifying responsible institutions 
and setting binding timeframes for review and update contributes to holding States to account for failures 
to deliver on their commitments. For an open and inclusive review and update process, it would be 
desirable to entrust this task to an institution different from the one responsible for drafting the initial 
NAP, and to ensure a robust participation of all relevant stakeholders including national parliaments. 
Insufficient alignment of the pillars, coupled with a failure to adopt a smart regulatory mix 
including extraterritorial measures 
As seen, the UNGPs’ polycentric governance approach requires that the ‘respect, protect and remedy’ 
pillars of the framework are treated as a complementary whole, with each pillar supporting the others in 
achieving sustainable progress.62 Yet existing EU Member NAPs cover the three pillars unevenly, with 
little attention given in particular to remediation (pillar three).63 Moreover, many NAPs focus on pillar 
two at the expense of exploring the full scope of the state duty to protect in relation to the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. One consequence is that, as in the case of the Danish NAP, 
                                                     
55 Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, ‘Advice: Response to the National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights 
“Knowing and Showing” (February 2014) 2. 
56 See Swedish NAP (n 49) 19. 
57 See Finish NAP (n 51) 32. 
58 Danish Government, ‘Danish National Action Plan: Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights’ (March 2014) 22. 
59 UK Government, ‘Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – updated May 
2016’ (May 2016) 2. 
60 See ‘Human Rights and Business Inquiry’, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-
select/human-rights-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/inquiry/. 
61 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 9-10. 
62 See above, section two. 
63 See ICAR & ECCJ Assessment (n 42) 4. 
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measures relating to pillar two appear reminiscent of the old ‘voluntary’ approach to CSR in that they 
heavily rely on corporate self-regulation and access to non-judicial remedies.64 Relatedly, the NAPs fail 
to make sufficient use of mandatory instruments, with state actions listed under pillar one mainly 
confined to ‘soft’ measures such as state guidance, awareness raising, and training initiatives.65 While 
important, such measures are not suitable to address well-documented protection gaps in the legal 
framework governing business and human rights, particularly in the area of access to justice and 
effective remedies.66 This failure to close legal protection gaps is aggravated by the fact that all NAPs 
including the 2016 UK update give priority to describing past measures over outlining concrete future 
actions. 
The insufficient alignment of the three pillars translates into a failure of the NAPs to adopt a ‘smart mix’ 
of voluntary and mandatory instruments that would allow States to use their political and financial 
leverage in incentivising or compelling corporations to respect human rights. The NAPs’ approach to 
human rights due diligence – the heart of pillar two – is a good example. Human rights due diligence is 
not only relevant in relation to the corporate responsibility to respect in that it enables businesses to 
manage stakeholder-related risk. Incentivising or requiring human rights due diligence is equally a 
means for States to comply with their duty to protect human rights.67 The EU Member State NAPs fail 
to sufficiently operationalize this mutually reinforcing relationship between pillars one and two. The 
Dutch government, for example, commits to taking a more proactive role in implementing the UNGPs 
and to analysing its current regulatory mix as applied to human rights due diligence.68 However, the 
Dutch NAP largely confines itself to listing supportive government actions (such as awareness raising 
and capacity building) and does not provide for legislative and enforcement measures. As concerns the 
latter, the NAP concludes that consultations have ‘failed to produce consensus on whether the 
obligations of Dutch companies in relation to CSR are adequately regulated by law’ and merely commits 
to further examining the existing legal framework in the light of ‘the situation in neighbouring countries 
(level playing field), and the effects of legislation on companies and the business climate’.69 
The preparation of the German NAP offers an example of how achieving a smart regulatory mix through 
a proper alignment of the three pillars can be jeopardized during the drafting process, with the 
consequence of undermining the polycentric governance approach envisaged by the UNGPs. A 2013 
scoping study for the German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs had highlighted the importance of 
the state duty to protect in ensuring and monitoring corporate human rights due diligence.70 The later 
drafting process including multi-stakeholder consultations was conducted under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In July 2016, the Ministry of Finance – not previously involved in the 
process – requested significant revisions of the draft NAP, allegedly under the pressure of corporate 
                                                     
64 See Danish NAP (n 58) 17-18. 
65 See ICAR & ECCJ Assessment (n 42) 4. 
66 A recent report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights asserts that ‘while many domestic legal regimes focus 
primarily on within-territory business activities and impacts, the realities of global supply chains, cross-border trade, 
investment, communications and movement of people are placing new demands on domestic legal regimes and those 
responsible for implementing them’; see H. R. C., ‘Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-
related human rights abuse’, A/HRC/32/19 (10 May 2016) para 5; see further G. Skinner, A. McCorquodale & O. de 
Schutter, ‘The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business (ICAR, 
CORE & ECCJ: 2013). 
67 See Ruggie (n 9) 4. 
68 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights’ (April 2014). 
69 Id. 28, 41. Considering access to justice, the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights has urged the Dutch government ‘to 
remove the procedural inequality between victims of human rights violations and companies who violate human rights’, 
see ‘Advice’ (n 55) 2. 
70 J. Knopf, C. Rees, D. Augenstein et al., ‘Unternehmensverantwortung für Menschenrechte: Ableitung von Handlungs-
empfehlungen auf der Basis von Experteninterviews und internationalen Fallstudien’ (Februar 2013), 
https://www.adelphi.de/de/publikation/unternehmensverantwortung-f%C3%BCr-menschenrechte. 
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lobbying.71 The July 2016 draft (which is not in the public domain) would have omitted any reference 
to legislative instruments requiring human rights due diligence. Proposals to elaborate corporate due 
diligence obligations through best-practice examples and guidelines were branded as ‘sweeping’ and 
‘arbitrary’. The entire chapter on monitoring would have been removed. The final NAP published in 
December 2016 is an awkward compromise that, while in some regards paving new ground (such as a 
2020 benchmark on implementing corporate human rights due diligence), appears overall noncommittal 
and dominated by concerns of creating a ‘global level playing field’ for German corporations.72  
To achieve the leverage required for operationalising the UNGPs’ polycentric global governance 
framework, States’ ‘smart mix’ of mandatory and voluntary measures must furthermore include 
instruments with extraterritorial effect that reach out to corporate practice abroad. In this regard the 
UNWG Guidance recommends, in line with the approach taken by the UNGPs,73 that governments 
ensure ‘that measures outlined in the NAP take full advantage of the leverage home states have in order 
to effectively prevent, address, and redress extraterritorial impacts of corporations domiciled within their 
territory and/or jurisdiction’.74 In a similar vein, ENNHRI has urged the European Commission to 
develop NAP guidance emphasizing ‘that NAPs extend in scope, like the UNGPs, to matters both inside 
and outside the state’s territorial jurisdiction.75 There is some best practice in the EU Member States 
concerning the use of extraterritorial instruments in the business and human rights domain, both 
legislative and court-driven.76 Nevertheless, the provisions in the existing NAPs concerning 
extraterritorial measures are very weak to non-existent. Some NAPs, including the Dutch and the Danish 
one, doubt the usefulness of extraterritorial instruments and envisage setting up working groups to 
further discuss their need and feasibility.77 Other NAPs confine themselves to expressing an expectation 
that corporations respect human rights when operating abroad or remain entirely silent on the issue.  
This reluctance to use extraterritorial instruments is inconsistent with a basic premise that appears to 
inform all EU Member State NAPs, namely that corporate human rights abuse is most likely to happen 
abroad. It is also difficult to justify given that there is nothing unusual per se about states employing 
measures with extraterritorial effect, particularly in areas of law with a strong market-nexus such as 
antitrust or securities regulation.78 As the SRSG notes in one of his reports to the UN Human Rights 
Council, while States have in certain policy domains agreed to the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
this is ‘typically not the case in business and human rights’.79 The NAPs’ reluctance to use 
                                                     
71 See ‘Lobbyismus auf Regierungsebene: Profit statt Menschenrechte‘, Monitor (9 September 2016), http://www1.wdr.de/ 
daserste/monitor/sendungen/lobbyismus-104.html. 
72 See German NAP (n 48). The German Institute for Human Rights that was heavily invested in the process described the final 
NAP as evincing ‘a lack of political will to advance the UNGPs’; see Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, 
‘Stellungnahme: “Zögerliche Umsetzung”. Der politische Wille reicht nicht weiter: Deutschland setzt die VN-
Leitprinzipien um – mit kleinen Schritten’ (21 December 2016), available at https://business-
humanrights.org/de/deutschland-ausw%C3%A4rtiges-amt-schliesst-konsultationsphase-zum-nationalen-aktionsplan-zu-
wirtschaft-und-menschenrechten-ab#c148465. 
73 See ‘2010 Report’ (n 14) para 55.    
74 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 18. 
75 See ENNHR (n 43) 2. 
76 For example, the UK Bribery Act 2010 that provides for liability of UK companies in the UK for acts of bribery committed 
anywhere in the world; a French Bill relating to the duty of care of parent companies and contracting undertakings that, if 
adopted, would establish legal obligations of French companies in relation to the human rights impacts of their subsidiaries 
and sub-contractors overseas; and a series of court cases in the Netherlands against Royal Dutch Shell Plc and its Nigerian 
subsidiary for environmental pollution and human rights violations in Nigeria. 
77 See Dutch NAP (n 68) 39; Danish NAP (n 58) 16. 
78 See further J. Zerk, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights Sphere from Six Regulatory 
Areas’, 59, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper (Kennedy School of Governance, Harvard 
University: 2010). 
79 See ‘2010 Report’ (n 14) para 46. 
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extraterritorial instruments is concerning not only because it threatens to undermine the global 
regulatory regime envisaged by the UNGPs but also because it suggests an insufficient reception of 
more recent developments in international human rights law.80 In the latter regard, the UN Treaty Bodies 
have already called upon EU Member States to take appropriate legislative, judicial and administrative 
steps to prevent and redress human rights violations committed by corporations domiciled within their 
jurisdiction when operating abroad.81 
Improving the Implementation of the UNGPs via NAPs: Lessons from the OMC 
The Concept of the Open Method of Coordination 
One can build a more complete picture of the strengths and limitations of the existing NAP process by 
engaging with the history of other forms of trans-national policy coordination. A prime example in this 
regard is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) – a process for multi-lateral surveillance introduced 
to coordinate EU social policies in the late 90’s.82 Since that period, the method has spread to a number 
of further policy areas, from education to culture, health, fiscal policy and beyond. While one of the 
characteristic features of the OMC is the lack of any one single procedural model applicable to all fields, 
the core of the method was elaborated by the Lisbon European Council in 2000. Most OMC processes 
thus contain some elements of the following four features: 
 ‘Fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals which 
they set in the short, medium and long terms; 
 Establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against 
the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means 
of comparing best practice; 
 Translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets 
and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences; 
 Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning processes.’83 
Understanding the usefulness of the OMC for the implementation of the UNGPs via National Action 
Plans requires understanding the rationale for the OMC’s creation. At its core is a tension between 
diversity and interdependence. For the EU of the late 1990s and early 2000s, interdependence meant the 
increasing realization that in a common currency Union, fiscal and social policies were likely to have 
severe spill-over effects between States (potentially capable of de-stabilising the Union itself). The 
diversity concern was that extensive EU intervention in areas such as budgetary and social policy was 
legally, politically and functionally infeasible.84 Legally, the EU carried unclear competences in these 
                                                     
80 On the extraterritorial application of international human rights treaties with focus on economic, social and cultural rights 
see ‘Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ 
(Maastricht: 2011), published with extensive commentary in 34 Human Rights Quarterly (2012) 1084-1169; and more 
recently C. E. S. C. R., ‘General Comment on State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities’, E/C.12/60/R.1 (17 October 2016). 
81 CERD, ‘Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, CERD/C/GBR/CO/18-20 (14 
September 2011); Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the sixth periodic report of Germany, adopted 
by the Committee at its 106th session (November 2012). 
82 On the history of the OMC see M. Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law (Cambridge 
University Press: 2011) 24-68. On its more recent evolution see E. Barcevicius, J.T. Weishaupt & J. Zeitlin, ‘Tracing the 
Social OMC from its Origins to Europe 2020’, in Assessing the Open Method of Coordination: Institutional Design and 
National Influence of EU Social Policy (Palgrave MacMillan: 2014). 
83 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council (23-24.03.2000) para 37. 
84 See F. Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’, 40 Journal of Common Market 
Studies (2002) 4. 
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domains under the European Treaties.85 Politically, Member States were unwilling to transfer more 
control to an unloved Brussels machinery. Meanwhile, functionally, any attempt at EU harmonization 
would likely flounder given the obvious diversity between the social and fiscal regimes of the Member 
States. Open Coordination was the perfect solution to this dilemma.86 It promised coordinated EU action, 
guided by common principles and goals, but EU action that respected ‘legitimate diversity’ between 
different national legal and social orders.87 It also promised a more responsive form of EU regulation, 
where Member States could shift and change their policy priorities according to new developments, and 
experiment with and learn from the practices of their neighbours.88 The outcome – a process of national 
plans based on EU goals, with peer-level review, exchange and benchmarking at the EU level – was 
thus seen as the best of both worlds: EU action without steering and control from the top down. 
Lessons from the OMC for the UNGP NAP Process 
The rationale behind the OMC – responding to increased interdependency while also respecting 
legitimate diversity – is not far removed from that of the UNGP NAP process. The UNGPs’ attempt to 
‘close governance gaps created by globalisation’ responds to the necessity of enhanced state cooperation 
in preventing and redressing corporate human rights abuse under conditions of global interdependency.89 
The ability of States to enforce human rights in relation to businesses incorporated within their 
jurisdiction increasingly depends on the human rights practise of other States where those businesses 
may be producing, packaging and trading their goods. Responding to this challenge requires consistent 
and effective international standards that ensure corporate compliance with human rights wherever they 
operate. At the same time, the legal and political orders into which the UNGPs must fit, and the state 
capacity to enforce them, varies considerably between national contexts. As a result, agreement on 
binding international norms – such as an overarching Treaty regime – has thus far proven difficult to 
achieve.90 As the UNWG Guidance puts it, ‘while all NAPs share common ground in their alignment 
with the UNGPs and with international human rights instruments, … NAPs and the processes through 
which they are developed and updated must also adjust to each State’s capacity and cultural and historic 
contexts’.91 
The OMC’s experience provides a number of lessons as to how the NAP process could manage this 
tension between interdependence and diversity successfully. Rather unsurprisingly, given the high hopes 
that greeted its arrival, the OMC in practice rarely lived up to its full promise. A key concern within 
                                                     
85 See the limits on social policy measures contained in Article 153 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). 
86 J. Zeitlin, ‘Social Europe and Experimentalist Governance: Towards a New Constitutional Compromise?’ in G. de Burca 
(ed.) EU Law and the Welfare State: in Search of Solidarity (Oxford University Press: 2005); G. de Burca, ‘The 
Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European Union’, 28 European Law Review (2003) 6. 
87 F. Scharpf, ‘Legitimate Diversity: The New Challenge of European Integration’ in T. Borzel and R. Cichowski (eds.), The 
State of the European Union: Law, Politics and Society (Oxford University Press: 2003). 
88 C. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European 
Union’, in Experimentalist Governance in the European Union (Oxford University Press: 2010); S. Deakin and O. de 
Schutter, ‘Reflexive Governance and the Dilemmas of Social Regulation’ in Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the Open 
Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe? (Brulyant: 2005). 
89 See ‘2008 Report’ (n 8) para 3. 
90 An early failed attempt in this regard were the 2003 UN Draft Norms that proposed to directly impose international human 
rights obligations on corporations; see UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (26 August 2003). In 2014, the UN 
Human Rights Council adopted a resolution establishing a working group tasked with drafting an international human 
rights and business treaty; see H. R. C., ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’, A/HRC/RES/26/9 (14 July 2014). 
91 See UNWG Guidance (n 20) 4. 
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social science research has been the OMC’s effectiveness.92 The EU’s original Lisbon Strategy – replete 
with goals designed to boost the EU’s economic and social performance – failed to reach most of its 
headline targets, with much of the blame falling at the OMC’s door.93 The problem was seen as one of 
the OMC’s voluntary nature: if Member States were to deliver social and economic goals through purely 
national plans, what was their incentive to be responsive to common EU objectives? It was feared that 
national reports would merely list programs governments wished to implement anyway. States would 
follow EU principles they agreed with and disregard those that involved budgetary and political costs. 
Such a risk also presents itself in relation to National Action Plans implementing the UNGPs – and has 
already shown signs of realisation in those EU Member State NAPs that mainly confine themselves to 
listing past national achievements.94 UNGP NAPs, too, are designed as a largely nationally guided 
process with few explicit incentives (either positive or negative) for governments to respond directly to 
international norms. 
However, the OMC’s evolution from these early experiences also illustrates how both positive and 
negative incentives can be established. While empirical accounts of the first ten years of the OMC’s life 
are relatively sceptical about its ability to induce direct policy change, these accounts are more 
supportive of ‘second order’ effects.95 Second-order effects concern the ability of the OMC to alter the 
process through which national and EU policy-making is conducted, encouraging policy-making to be 
more responsive to over-arching substantive goals. Examples include the ability of the OMC to 
mainstream social goals across government departments, to place new issues on the national political 
agenda or to improve policy-makers’ understanding of the relationship between policies and effects (on 
inequality, poverty and other indicators). This speaks to some elements of the UNWG and ICAR-ECCJ 
NAP Guidance already taken up by a number EU Member States, such as the emphasis placed on inter-
ministerial and cross-departmental cooperation and on including civil society actors into the 
development and implementation of NAPs.96  
Structural Features of the OMC Process 
The ability to induce second-order effects depends on a number of structural features of the OMC 
process – features that the UNGP NAP process does not yet possess. These include, first, an 
infrastructure for States to conduct peer review on the performance of other States. In the OMC case, 
this is normally done within specialized committees, made up of national representatives and EU 
officials, who assess national plans according to common EU objectives and indicators. Peer review can 
be seen in terms of both negative and positive inducement. Negatively, peer review allows States to 
critically assess the performance of their neighbours, particularly in circumstances where negative 
national performance can have externalities on other States.97 Here, peer review provides a reason (in 
                                                     
92 See e.g. M. Eckhardt, ‘The Open Method of Coordination on Pensions: an Economic Analysis of its Effects on Pension 
Reforms’ 15 Journal of European Social Policy (2005) 247; M. Lodge, ‘Comparing Non-Hierarchical Governance in 
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Publications of the EU: 2004). 
94 See ICAR & ECCJ Assessment (n 42) and further above, section three. 
95 On the OMC’s national effects, see Dawson (n 82) 164-234; J. Zeitlin and M. Heidenreich, Changing European Employment 
and Welfare Regimes: The Influence of the OMC on National Reforms (Routledge: 2009). 
96 See above, section three. 
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the absence of ‘hard’ legal obligations) for national officials to take seriously both the quality of their 
NAPs and the outcomes that domestic reforms produce over time. Yet peer review is about more than 
‘negative’ shaming: empirical evidence from the OMC in the social policy field suggests that peer 
review mainly focuses on positive performers.98 How have neighbouring States managed to successfully 
tackle endemic problems such as child poverty or long-term unemployment and how can their regulatory 
approach inform reform efforts elsewhere? Here, peer review exploits the positive aspects of 
interdependence: that other States are likely to face similar problems and may have innovative solutions 
that can be replicated.99 
Secondly, part of the OMC’s success has been associated with developing indicators and improving the 
information basis through which national policy-makers form their decisions. In the field of social 
policy, for example, the EU’s Social Protection Committee has developed a Social Protection 
Performance Monitor (SPPM), whose function is to track the performance of EU Member States 
according to different metrics of social performance (e.g. employment, health and material 
deprivation).100 Crucially, the function of indicator development is not only cross-national comparison 
but also allows States to better understand causal relationships and correlations between different forms 
of regulation and social outcomes. What, for example, is the impact of early school-leaving on 
employment and productivity, or the effect of fiscal transfers to certain vulnerable groups on the poverty 
rate? The goal in this sense is not a convergence of social policies across States but a better 
understanding of the capacities and limitations of various policy tools to achieve a given goal. As 
highlighted in section three, the issue of indicators and benchmarks is one for which both the NAP 
guidance and NAP development in the EU Member States has thus far shown little interest. 
Thirdly, one should reflect on the OMC’s failures as well as its successes. A frequently lamented feature 
of open coordination has been its poor record in terms of participation and transparency.101 This record 
has had a bearing not only on the OMC’s wider legitimacy but also on its effectiveness. The failure, for 
example, to include parliaments and regional bodies in the process of establishing national plans under 
the OMC gave rise to complaints that open coordination suffers from a lack of national and regional 
ownership, with ambitious goals set at the EU-level often forgotten or disappointed when ‘translated’ 
into national action.102 This is particularly so in certain types of constitutional order: in federal states 
(e.g. Germany where lower-levels of governance have strong regulatory powers) or states with strong 
forms of parliamentary control (e.g. in Scandinavia), government plans without wider institutional input 
risk being overturned by other bodies later in the policy-making process. 
These factors – providing an appropriate institutional and procedural infrastructure for the OMC – have 
been key to open coordination’s successes and limitations. A policy coordination process that relies 
purely on national reporting, without any inducements to deliver on commitments made or improve 
performance over time, can easily slip into a box-ticking exercise that is increasingly unresponsive to 
its initial goals. Similarly, a national strategy without wide domestic buy-in, including from 
constitutionally significant bodies, cannot expect to deliver wide-ranging reforms. Finally, a process of 
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Kröger, ‘The End of Democracy as we know it? The Legitimacy Deficits of Bureaucratic Social Policy Governance’ 29 
Journal of European Integration (2007) 5. 
102 See ‘Kok report’ (n 93); Dawson (n 82) 199-206. 
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developing complex national strategies in response to transnational and global challenges is simply a 
wasted opportunity if no structures exist to compare national performance, to improve collective 
understanding of evolving shared problems, and to allow States to respond to the practices of their 
neighbours. Given the many features that the UNGP NAP process and the OMC share in common, the 
lessons learnt from the open coordination’s existing history should be taken into account. 
Towards an Open Method of Coordination for Business and Human Rights 
An OMC for Business and Human Rights in the EU Governance Context 
Many of the lessons of the OMC are relevant for the implementation of the UNGPs at a global level. 
The OMC’s experience points to some deficiencies of the otherwise highly detailed existing guidance 
for National Action Plans. The lack of sufficient consideration for indicator development, 
benchmarking, peer pressure and mutual learning through peer review suggests concerns about the 
broader sustainability and effectiveness of the NAP process. Some lessons, however, may have more 
specific relevance to the European Union and the connections between the NAP process and the broader 
structure of EU governance. The vast majority of currently existing NAPs stem from EU Member States. 
This creates a unique opportunity for developing national measures in a coordinated manner within the 
European Union. One noticeable aspect of many of the NAPs produced by EU Member States is their 
frequent references, either to EU-wide strategies on CSR, or to EU legislative measures.103 Moreover, 
the competence to implement a comprehensive business and human rights strategy is shared between 
the EU and the Member States. As a consequence, the EU has in some areas already developed 
legislation of its own, which raises issues concerning the coherence of EU and national measures and 
(by the operation of EU competence rules) limits Member States’ own powers to set binding 
standards.104 
These considerations raise the prospect of developing a European OMC process for business and human 
rights. The idea of applying the OMC to the realm of EU fundamental rights more broadly is not a new 
one.105 It has, however, faced two key obstacles in the past. First, the legal powers available to the Union 
to develop an autonomous fundamental rights policy have often been contested and remain unclear.106 
Second, Member States have tended to see open coordination processes as a bureaucratic burden, 
establishing potentially costly and time-consuming implementation structures without clear rewards.107 
These objections seem less pressing when considering an OMC in the more specific field of business 
and human rights. Regarding the competence-based obstacle, as discussed above, many issues relating 
to the UNGPs touch upon areas of shared competence. By implementing EU legislation on matters such 
as accounting standards for trans-national corporations or human trafficking, the Member States are 
implementing the UNGPs under the shadow of EU law. The OMC could be used to monitor national 
implementation of EU laws that carry a business and human rights dimension, ensuring consistency and 
coherence of these laws throughout the European Union. Some key EU Directives already establish a 
                                                     
103 See e.g. Swedish NAP (n 49) 27; Finnish NAP (n 51) 16-19. 
104 See ‘Commission Staff Document 2015’ (n 27) and further above, section two. 
105 See O. de Schutter, ‘The Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights through the Open Method of Coordination’ 
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duty of the European Commission to monitor their national implementation for this very reason.108 
While such a coordination process would lack a distinct legal basis in the EU Treaties, this has not 
prevented the establishment of OMCs in other policy areas (such as social inclusion), provided open 
coordination is used as a mechanism to support and complement, rather than entirely harmonise, the 
laws of the Member States. Secondly, it is questionable whether an OMC on business and human rights 
would constitute a significant additional bureaucratic burden. The vast majority of Member States have 
produced, or have committed to producing, NAPs on business and human rights and/or CSR. Moreover, 
the European Commission has already dedicated expertise and resources to organising peer reviews on 
CSR and business and human rights,109 and the European Council’s Working Group on Human Rights 
(COHOM) in any case monitors the national implementation of the UNGPs as part of its work on 
implementing the EU’s Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy.110 
The Role and Added Value of an OMC for Business and Human Rights 
What would be the role and added value of an explicit OMC process then? First, an OMC on Business 
and Human Rights could contribute to avoiding duplication, overlap and inconsistency in the 
implementation of different business and human rights processes at EU and Member State level. As 
mentioned in some of the NAPs, the obligations created under the UNGPs mirror a number of other 
international instruments binding EU Member States, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises,111 or the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy.112 At the same time, the Commission’s CSR strategy tends to focus on ensuring coherence 
between different branches of EU action rather between EU, international and national policies.113 By 
establishing a forum of institutionalised cooperation between national and EU actors in which divergent 
approaches to business and human rights can be monitored and addressed, an OMC process could be a 
central vehicle in delivering policy coherence across the European Union. 
Second, an OMC process could act as a means of identifying where further EU action to implement the 
UNGP may be necessary. This relates to the point regarding shared competences above. While some 
reforms necessary to implement the UNGPs can be delivered via purely national action, a coordinated 
European approach may be more effective in addressing those business and human rights challenges 
with a strong cross-border element. To take the example of accounting discussed above, EU rules in this 
area are likely to have far greater influence in encouraging corporations to disclose information about 
human rights-related standards than domestic regulation – which may be perceived as creating 
incentives for corporations to re-locate to other EU Member States with less intrusive standards.114 In 
simple terms, by providing a comparative overview of how EU Member States are implementing the 
                                                     
108 For example, the duty contained in EU accounting directives (establishing duties on the disclosure of non-financial 
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UNGPs, an OMC process would allow actors at the European and national level to identify the potential 
and limitations of future EU action on business and human rights.115 
Third, the OMC could act as an incentive structure for Member States to deliver on the content of their 
NAPs. Depending on the design of the process, an OMC procedure would set-out specific timetables 
and feedback mechanisms for NAPs on business and human rights. Timetabling could encourage States 
to make actionable commitments through specific deadlines (a concern mirrored in the lack of ‘SMART’ 
measures in current NAPs), exerting particular pressure on those States that have repeatedly promised 
NAPs but failed to deliver them. Feedback mechanisms, such as peer reviews, would also allow Member 
States to nudge each other into following prior commitments outlined in the NAPs.116 Furthermore, the 
OMC’s history indicates some evidence of open coordination facilitating rights of ‘structural entry’ for 
NGOs and civil society actors in national strategies, potentially building a coalition of national actors to 
encourage governments to deliver NAP promises.117 
Fourth, the OMC could act as a space for mutual learning and the exchange of good practices between 
EU Member States.118 Those peer reviews that have been conducted on Member States’ CSR strategies 
demonstrate the usefulness of peer review in understanding common challenges (such as regulating 
business and human rights in times of austerity) and identifying emerging strategies to meet these 
challenges (such as establishing training networks for small and medium-sized enterprises).119 A peer 
review process for business and human rights was considered by the European Commission in its 2011 
CSR Strategy, but not followed-up in a systematic manner, in spite of some indications of Member State 
support.120 As discussed in the previous section, the purpose of peer review under an OMC process is 
not just ‘peer pressure’ but also the identification of innovative strategies to meet shared problems under 
conditions of mutual interdependence, that is, to productively use the diversity of national 
implementation strategies regarding the UNGPs as an experimental advantage from which the EU as a 
whole may benefit. 
Fifth, the drafting history of the German NAP in particular illustrates that the process through which a 
NAP is adopted is an essential factor in determining the outcome of the UNGP implementation process 
at the national level.121 In this regard, the structural features of the OMC could contribute to enhancing 
the substantive quality of EU Member State NAPs. As concerns achieving a smart regulatory mix 
through a proper alignment of the three pillars, many existing NAPs appear preoccupied with securing 
a favourable business climate and ‘level playing field’ for national corporations.122 Leaving aside 
allegations of direct corporate bias, this is not an illegitimate concern. However, a pan-European OMC 
could ensure a more balanced consideration of the views and interests of all affected stakeholders at 
home and abroad by strengthening cross-sectoral and transnational allegiances between the different 
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stakeholder groups. An important rationale for introducing the OMC was the insight that creating a 
common European market had significant spill-over effects on domestic social policy that needed to be 
addressed at the EU level to resolve collective action problems between the Member States and avoid a 
regulatory ‘race to the bottom’. Where legal harmonization proved undesirable or unfeasible given 
legitimate national diversity, an OMC-based peer review process enabled Member States to nonetheless 
scrutinise and influence each other’s policies to avoid negative externalities and undue competitive 
advantages gained through negative national performance. Over the past decade we have witnessed a 
progressive ‘hardening’ of initially voluntary CSR initiatives in the European Union, including (at the 
European level) through the introduction of mandatory non-financial reporting and the concretisation of 
corporate human rights due diligence requirements and (at the Member State level) various initiatives 
to give legal teeth to the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and other international CSR 
agreements.123 In this regard, an OMC on Business and Human Rights could function as an important 
platform for sharing and evaluating best practices and ensuring policy coherence through avoiding 
duplication of, and inconsistencies between, policy efforts at the European and national levels. 
Sixth, various NAPs emphasise that the policy drivers behind and the effects of extraterritorial measures 
remain rather poorly understood,124 including the impacts of such measures on the domestic business 
climate.125 Apart from being warranted from a human rights perspective to avoid double standards of 
protection in home- and host states of corporate investment, experiences from other policy areas with a 
strong market nexus (anti-corruption, securities and antitrust) suggest that extraterritorial instruments 
can contribute to creating a global level playing field.126 Partly due to its ‘sui generis’ legal and political 
structure somewhere between a state and an international organisation, the European Union is replete 
with examples of laws and policies that reach out beyond state borders, both internally and in relation 
to wider world.127 It thus constitutes a privileged site of authority for further experimenting with 
extraterritorial instruments in the business and human rights domain. In this regard, the OMC can play 
an important role in enhancing European and national policy-makers’ understanding of the usefulness 
and effectiveness of extraterritorial measures in addressing human rights challenges brought about by 
conditions of increased global interdependency. 
Designing an OMC for Business and Human Rights 
How would an OMC on business and human rights look in practice? As discussed above, the history of 
the OMC suggests that there is no ‘one size fits all’ model.128 In this sense, the very advantage of an 
open coordination process is that it need not fit within existing legal categories but can be shaped to 
meet the preferences and needs of the actors involved. Some core minimum requirements, however, 
should be: 
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 Establishing a common time-table for the production and revision of NAPs as part of a bi-annual 
or tri-annual cycle; 
 Tasking a specific institution (e.g. a committee of national representatives within the Commission 
or Council) with overseeing the NAP process and conducting state-to-state peer review; 
 Building up qualitative and quantitative indicators to allow the comparative benchmarking or 
indexing of national performance on business and human rights (including via existing indicator 
systems for CSR built by other international organisations);129 
 Facilitating civil society involvement, both at the EU level (e.g. via the EU’s multi-stakeholder 
platform on CSR) and at the national level (e.g. through incorporating into EU peer review an 
indicator concerning national civil society participation in the development and review of NAPs); 
 Establishing mechanisms connecting the NAP process with the EU’s ongoing CSR strategy (to 
ensure that those responsible for designing EU initiatives in the field of business and human rights 
are included in the monitoring and peer-review process). 
The schema above provides only a first sketch of what an OMC process for business and human rights 
might look like. One should not over-estimate its potential – as much as the OMC’s history in the social 
policy field provides lessons, these are not easily generalizable to other policy fields. Given the potential 
benefits of such a process, however, an OMC for business and human rights ought to be seriously 
considered. It may provide one means to provide new energy and impetus to the implementation process 
of the UNGPs, which is where current attention should be directed to.130 
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